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"Without a hypothesis, that is, without anticipation of the facts by the minds,
there is no science." Claude BERNARD
(Translated from French and commented
by Professor Daniel Gianola; received April 6,  1999)
Preamble - When  the Editor of Genetics, Selection, Evolution asked me
to translate this paper by the late Professor Gustave MALECOT  into French,
I felt flattered and  intimidated at the same  time. The  paper was  extensive and
highly technical, and written in an unusual manner for today’s standards, as
the phrases are long, windy  and, sometimes, seemingly never ending. However,
this was an assignment that I could not refuse, for reasons that should become
clear subsequently.
I have attempted  to preserve MALtCOT’s  style as much  as possible. Hence,
I maintained  his original punctuation, except for a few  instances in which  I was
forced to introduce a comma  here and there, so that the reader could catch
some breath! In those instances in which I was unsure of the exact meaning
of the phrase, or when I  felt  that some clarification was needed, I  inserted
footnotes. The  original paper also contains footnotes by MALTCOT;  mine  are
indicated as "Translator’s Note", following the usual practice;  hence, there
should be little room  for confusion. There are a few typographical errors and
inconsistencies in the original text, but given the length of  the manuscript and
that  it was  written many  years before word  processors had  appeared, the paper
is remarkably free of  errors.
This is undoubtedly one of the most brilliant and  clear statements in favor
of the Bayesian position that I have encountered, specially considering that it
was published in 1947! Here, MALECOT  uses his eloquence and knowledge of
science, mathematics, statistics and, more  fundamentally, of  logic, to articulate
a criticism of the points of view advanced by FISHER  and by NEYMAN  in
connection with statistical inference. He argues in a convincing (this  is  my
subjective opinion!) manner that in the evaluation of hypotheses, speaking ina broad sense, it is difficult to accept the principle of maximum  likelihood and
the theory of confidence intervals unless BAYES formula is brought into the
picture. In particular, his discussion of the two types of errors that arise in
the usual &dquo;accept/reject&dquo;  paradigm of NEYMAN  is one of the strongest parts
of the paper. MALECOT  argues effectively that it  is impossible to calculate
the total probability of error unless prior probabilities are brought into the
treatment of the problem. This is probably one of the most lucid treatments
that I have been able to find in the literature.
The English speaking audience will be surprised to find that the famous
CRAMER-RAO lower bound for  the variance of an unbiased estimator  is
credited to FRECHET,  in a paper that this author published in 1943. C.R.
RAO’s paper had been printed in  1945! The reference given by MALECOT
(FRECHET,  1934) is not accurate, this being probably due  to a typographical
error.  If it  can be verified that actually FRECHET  (or perhaps DARMOIS)
discovered this bound  first, the entire statistical community  should be alerted,
such that history can be written correctly.  In fact, some statistics books in
France  refer to the FRECHET-DARMOIS-CRAMER-RAO  inequality, whereas
texts in English mention  the CRAMER-RAO  lower bound  or the &dquo;information
inequality&dquo; 
..
On a personal note, I  view this paper as setting one of the pillars of the
modern school of Bayesian quantitative genetics, which would now seem to
have adherents. For example, when Jean-Louis FOULLEY  and I  started on
our road towards Bayesianism in the early 1980s, this was (in part) a result of
the influence of  writings of  the late Professor LEFORT,  who, in turn, had  been
exposed  to MALtCOT’s  thinking. In genetics, MALECOT  had  given a  general
solution to the problem of the resemblance between relatives based on the
concept of  identity by  descent (G. MALECOT,  Les math6matiques de l’heredite
Masson et  Cie.,  Paris,  1948). In this contemporary paper, we rediscover his
statistical views, which  point clearly in the Bayesian  direction. With  the advent
of Markov  chain Monte  Carlo methods, many  quantitative geneticists have now
implemented Bayesian methods, although probably this  is  more a result  of
computational, rather than of logical, considerations. In this context, I offer a
suggestion to geneticists that are interested in the principles underlying  science
and, more  particularly, in the Bayesian position: read MALECOT.
Daniel Gianola, Department of Animal Sciences, Department of Biostatis-
tics  and Medical  Informatics,  Department of Dairy  Science,  University  of
Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin 53706, USA
1. BAYES FORMULA
The fundamental problem of acquiring scientific knowledge can be posed
as  follows.  Given:  a system of knowledge that  has  been acquired  already
(certainties or probabilities) and which we  will denote as K; a set of mutually
exclusive and  exhaustive assumptions B i ,  that  is, such  that one  of  these must  be
true (but without knowing  which); and  an  experiment that has been conducted
and  that gives results E: what new  knowledge about O i   is brought about by E?
A  very general answer has been given in probabilistic terms by Bayes, in
his famous theorem; let P (0 1  [K)  be the probabilities of the O i   based on K, orprior  probabilities of the hypotheses; P (0 1  [ EK)  be their posterior  probabilities,
evaluated  taking  into  account  the new observations  E; P  (ElO i K)  be the
probability that the hypothesis O i ,  supposedly realized, gives the result E, a
probability that we  call the likelihood of B i   as a  function of E (within the  system
of knowledge K); the principles of  total and  composite probabilities give then:
the denominator P (ElK) = ¿ i  P  (E[ 01K) P (9 1  [ K) does not depend  on  i. One
can say, then, that the probabilities a posteriori (once E  has been realized) of
the  different hypotheses are respectively proportional to  the products of their
probabilities a priori times their likelihoods as a function of E (all this holding
in the interior of system K). The proportionality constant can be arrived at
immediately by writing that the sum of posterior probabilities is  equal to  1.
The  preceding rule still holds in the case where one cannot specify all possible
hypotheses B i   or all the probabilities P (E[0 1 K)  of their influence on E, but
then the sum of posterior probabilities P (0 1  [EK)  of all the hypotheses that
one has been able to formulate their consequences  would  be  lesser and  not equal
to 1.
We  will show how BAYES  formula provides logical rules for choosing one
B i   over all possible B i ,  or among  those whose consequences can be formulated;
further, it will be shown  how  the  rules adopted  in practice cannot have  a  logical
justification outside of the light of  this formula.
2. THE  RULE  OF THE  MOST  PROBABLE  HYPOTHESIS
We  shall begin a critical discussion of the methods proposed by FISHER’s
school by posing  the  rule  of the most probable  value:  choose the hypothesis
B i   having the largest posterior probability, with the risk of error given by the
sum  of the probabilities of the hypotheses discarded (when one can formulate
all such hypotheses)(the risk will be small only if this sum is  small;  it  may
be reasonable to group together several hypotheses having a total probability
close to  1,  without making a distinction between them; this we shall do in
Section VII)
In order to apply this rule,  it  is  necessary to determine the B i   giving the
maximum of P (E[9 1 K) P (9 1[ K).  It  follows  that  the  choice  of Bi  depends
not only on the likelihoods of the B i   but also on their  prior  probabilities,
often  subjective  and variable  between individuals,  even within  individuals
depending on the state of their knowledge or of their memory. However, it
must be noted that the presence of the prior probability in the formula is in
perfect agreement with  the  rule, admitted  by  most  experimenters, of  combining
(weighted naturally) all observations that provide information about a  certain
hypothesis. Suppose that after the experiments E, another set of experiments
E’ is carried out: collecting all such experiments one has:and the rule leads to choosing the 9 1   that maximizes the numerator; however,
the first  term represents the likelihood of O i   as a function of Ef within the
system EK,  and the product of the last two  is proportional to the probability
of O i   within the system EK,  that is:
which is the probability a priori of O i   before realization of E’; it  follows then
that one would obtain the same result maximizing P (E’ [ 9 jEK)  x P (9 j  [EK) ,
that is,  the product of the likelihood times the new  prior probability.
The  rule of  the most  likely value, as stated, takes into account all our knowl-
edge, at each instant, about all hypotheses examined, and every new  observa-
tion  is used  to update  their  probabilities by  replacing  the  probabilities evaluated
before such observation by posterior probabilities. The delicate point is what
values should be assigned to the probabilities a priori before any experimenta-
tion providing information about the hypotheses takes place. LAPLACE  and
BAYES proposed to take the prior probabilities of all  hypotheses as equal,
which makes  the posterior probabilities proportional to the likelihood, leading
in this case to the rule of maximum  likelihood proposed by Mr. Fisher l ,  a rule
that, unlike him, does not seem possible to me  to adopt as a first  principle,
because of the risk of applying it  to a given group of observations without
considering the set of other observations providing information about the hy-
potheses considered. A  striking example of this  pitfall  is  the contradiction,
noted by Mr. Jeffreys 2 ,  between the principle of maximum  likelihood and the
underlying principle of &dquo;significance  criteria&dquo;.  In this context, the objective is
to determine  if the observed results are in agreement with a  hypothesis or with
a simple law (the  &dquo;null  hypothesis&dquo;  of Mr. Fisher), or if the hypothesis must be
replaced by a more complicated one with the the alternative law being more
global,  including the old and the new parameters. To be precise,  if the old
law depends on  parameters  &OElig;l,..., &OElig;p,  the new  one  will depend  in addition on
&OElig;p+l,&dquo;’,  aP+q and  will reduce to the old one at given values of a P+1 , ... ,  aP+9
which can always be supposed to be equal to 0 (that is why the name  &dquo;null
hypothesis&dquo;  is given to the assumption that the old law is valid). The maxi-
mum  of P (EI&OElig; l &dquo;’&dquo;  &OElig;p+q, K)  when all the a i   vary will be larger in general
than its maximum  when a P+1  =  ...  =  ap + q 
=  0, hence, the rule of maximum
likelihood will lead, almost always, to adopting the most complicated law. On
the other hand, the usual criterion in this case is to investigate if there is not
a great risk of error made by adopting the simplest law: to do this one can
define a  &dquo;deviation&dquo;  between the observed results and  those that would be ex-
pected, on average, from the simplest law, and then find the prior probability
from such law of obtaining a deviation that is at least as large as the observed
distance. It is convenient not to reject the simplest law unless this probability
is very small. This  is the principle of  criteria based on  &dquo;significant  deviations&dquo;.
1  
’Iranslator’s Note: Fisher’s name  is in italics and  not in capital letters in the  original
paper. I have left this and other minor inconsistencies unchanged.
2  T ranslator’s Note: References to Jeffreys made  later in the paper appear  in capital
letters.Hence, the simplest law benefits from a favorable prejudice, that is,  of having
a prior probability that is  larger than that assigned to more complex laws.
Why  is it prejudged more favorably? Sometimes this is the result of our belief
on the simplicity of the laws of nature, a belief that may stem from conve-
nience (examples: the COPERNICUS  system is more convenient than that of
PTOLEMY  to understand the observations and  to make  predictions; fitting of
an ellipse to the trajectory of Mars by KEPLER  without consideration of the
law of gravitation), or from previous experience.
Consider the example of a fundamental type of experiment in agricultural
biology: comparing  the  yields of  two  varieties of  some  crop, by  planting  varieties
V and V’ adjacent to each other at  a number of points A l , ... , A N   of an
experimental field,  so as to  take  into  account  variability  in  light  and soil
conditions. If x l , ... , x N   and x ...... z% are the yields of V  and V’ measured
at the N  points, two main attitudes are possible when facing the data: those
inclined to believe that the difference between V  and V’ cannot affect yield
will  ask themselves if  all x i   and x’ can be reasonably viewed as observed
values of two random variables X  and X’ following the same law;  for  this,
they will adopt a significance test based on the difference between the means,
and  they  will maintain  their hypothesis  if this difference is not too large. On  the
other hand, those whose experience leads them to believe that the difference
in varieties should translate into a difference in yield will admit a priori that
the random  variables X  and X’ are different, introducing right away a larger
number  of  parameters (for example, X,  a, X!, , 0 &dquo;  if it is accepted  that X  and  X’
are Laplacian) and  they will be concerned immediately with the estimation of
these parameters, in particular X - X’, by  the method  of maximum  likelihood
for example (which in the case of laws of LAPLACE  with the same standard
deviation, gives as estimator  of  X -X!  the difference between  arithmetic means
of the x i   and x’); this method assumes implicitly that the prior probabilities
of the values of X -  X! are all equal and  infinitesimally small, which is quite
different from the  first hypothesis where a  priori we  view the value X -X! =  0
(corresponding to identity of the laws)  as having a finite probability. These
two  different attitudes correspond to different states of information a  priori, of
prior probabilities; the statistical criteria are, thus, not objective, because  there
could not be a contradiction between the two: it  is not possible that one leads
to the conclusion that  X &mdash; X’  =  0 and  the other to conclude that X -  X’ #  0.
This discrepancies result  from the fact  that the criteria  are subjective and
correspond to different states of information or experience.
We  shall now  take an example from genetics. A  problem of current interest
is  that of linkage between Mendelian factors. When  crossing a heterozygote
AaBb  with a double homozygote recessive, we  observe in the children, if these
are numerous, the genotypes ABab, abab, Abab, aBab in numbers a, ( 3, 7 ,
8  (&OElig; + (3 +, + 8 = N),  leading to admit that, independently, each child can
1 &mdash;  ?* 1 &mdash;  y  r  r
possess  one of the  4  genotypes with probabilities 1  2 r ,  &mdash;.&mdash;, r  r  
with
2  2 2  2
r  being  a  &dquo;coefficient  of  linkage&dquo;  having a value  between 0  and  1.  If  all
available knowledge were based on  a  certain number  of  crossing experiments  in
Drosophila, one would be led to state that all values of r inside of an interval
are equally  likely, and  then  take the maximum  likelihood estimate as value of  r,for each experiment. However, if one brings information from human  genetics
into the  picture, this shows  that r is almost always near  to ! ,  which  would  tend
1
to give a  privileged prior probability to -  2 when interpreting each measurement
taken in human genetics.  At any rate,  more advanced experimentation on
the behavior of chromosomes gives us a more precise basis for interpretation;
if the two factors  are  &dquo;located&dquo;  in  different  chromosomes, r  = 2, 
there is
&dquo;independent  segregation&dquo;  of the two characters. There is  &dquo;linkage&dquo;  r  < 2 I
&dquo;coupling&dquo;;  r  > 2:  &dquo;rep!lsion&dquo;  only when the two factors reside in the same
chromosome,  a  fact which, in the absence  of  any  information on  the  localization
1
of the two factors considered, would have a prior probability of 2 4   (because 24
there are 24 pairs of chromosomes  in humans).
In the light of this knowledge, one can start every study of linkage between
new  factors in humans  by assigning 24 and ! 
as values of  the prior probabili- 24 24
ties of  r = 2  and  r 2) 
if one can view the 
values r ! 2 as equally likely, that
is, take 2 4  
dr as the probability that r 7! 2 lies 
between  r and r +  dr, then  it is
easy to form the posterior probabilities of r = 2 
and r 2 ! 
the likelihood of
r (the probability that a given value r produces numbers a, / 3, q, 6 in the four
categories will be: 
, ,  n   I   .  -
which  gives, letting E be the observation of a, ,(3,  !y,  6:
Of these  two,  we will  retain  the  hypothesis  having  the  largest  posterior
probability; if this is hypothesis r 7!1, 
we  would take as estimate of  r, within
2
all  values r -I- !, 2 the 
one maximizing the posterior probability, that is,  the
_  !  7 +a
maximizer of the likelihood 2-!’ (1 - r) a +a  r l+8 ,  which has as value r = N  . 
*
N
I have deliberately presented the problem in a somewhat shocking manner,
emphasizing that the prior probabilities are known. Nevertheless, it cannot be
argued that the rule at which we arrive is not that in current use, or that at
least  it  is  in close numerical proximity 3 :  reject the &dquo;null  hypothesis&dquo;  if this
3  Translator’s Note: In the original, there is a delicate interplay of double negatives
which  is difficult to translate. The  phrase  is:  &dquo;On  ne peut n 6 anmoins  contester que lagives a large discrepancy with the observations;  subsequently,  estimate the
parameters by maximum  likelihood. My  objective has been to show on what
type of assumptions one  operates, willingly or unwillingly, when  these rules are
applied. Using prior probabilities,  it  is  possible to see the logical meaning of
the rules more  clearly, and a possibly precarious state of  the assumptions made
a priori can be thought of as a warning against the tendency of attributing an
absolute  value  to the conclusions (as done  by  Mr. MATHER  who  gives a  certain
number  of rules as being objectively best, even if these are contradictory): we
take note of  the arbitrariness in the choice of  the prior probabilities and  in the
1 1
manner of contrasting the hypotheses r = -  and r  - ;  2  
and we also see how
the conclusion about the value of r is subjective.
3. OPTIMUM  ESTIMATION
We  shall now  examine  another aspect of  the question  of  the  rule of  maximum
likelihood, which Mr. FISHER  (7) thought could be  justified independently of
prior probabilities, with  his rule of  optimum  estimation. Suppose  the competing
hypotheses are the values of a parameter 0,  with each value giving to the
observed  results E  a  probability 7 r  (E [ 9) before observation, which  is a function
of 0,  its  likelihood function; we will  call  an estimator of 0,  extracted from
observations E, any function H  of the observations only giving information
about the value of  0; same  as with the observations, this estimator is a random
variable before the data are observed, its probability law  depending  on  0. (In the
special case where, once the value H  is given, the conditional probability law  of
E  no longer depends on  0, it is unnecessary  to give a  complete description of E
once H  is known, because this would not give any supplementary information
about 0, and we then say that H  is an exhaustive 4  estimator of 9.)
It is said that H  is a  fair estimator 5  of  if  its mean  value M(H) 6   is always
equal to the true value  irrespective of what this  is.  It  is  said that H  is
asymptotically fair 7   if M(H) -  9 is infinitesimally small with N,  N  being the
number  of observations constituting E.
It  is said that H  is  correct8  if  it  always converges in probability towards  0
when N  tends towards infinity.  (For this, it suffices that  H  be asymptotically
fair and that it  has a fluctuation9  tending towards 0.  Conversely, every fair
estimator admitting a mean  is asymptotically fair).
regle a laquelle nous arrivons ne soit,  aux valeurs num6 T iques  des probabilites pres,
celle qui est d’un usage courant:... &dquo;.
4  
Translator’s Note: The English term is  sufficient.  Mal6cot’s terminology is  kept
whenever  it is felt that it has anecdotal value, or to reflect his style.
5   Translator’s Note: Unbiased estimator.
6   Translator’s Note: It is useful to remember  hereinafter that M  (expression) denotes
the expected value of the expression. The M  comes from  &dquo;moyenne&dquo; 
=  mean  value.
7   Translator’s Note: Asymptotically unbiased.
8   Translator’s Note: Consistent.
9   Translator’s Note: Fluctuation =  Variance.It  is said that H  is  asymptotically Gaussian  if the law of H  tends towards
one  of  the type LAPLACE-GAUSS  when N  increases indefinitely. In statistics,
it is frequent to encounter estimators that are both correct and  asymptotically
Gaussian; we shall denote such estimators as C.A.G (see, DUGUE, 5).  The
precision of such an estimator is  measured perfectly by M  [(H - 8) 2 ] 
= ( 2 ,
1
this becoming infinitesimally small with N; 
the precision will increase as !2 N
decreases, hence I  = &mdash;, 
which will be termed the quantity of information
extracted by the estimator, will be larger.
In what  follows, we  will restrict attention to the case where E  consists of N
independent observations xl, ... , !n, with their distribution functions being a
priori:
The  probability of a set E  of observations is:
(Stieltjes multiple differential) with
with the integration covering the entire space !J2N described by the Xi ,...  X N.
It  is then easy to show, with Mr. FRECHET  (8),  that the fluctuation !2 of
any fair estimator has a fixed lower bound. Let H (Xl, ... , X N)  be one such
estimator. For any 0:
from where, taking derivatives of  this identity with respect to 9:
leading to
I  ! .  !  I
Observing that
and  lettingit  is seen that the square of the coefficient of correlation between (H &mdash; 0) and
6 log !r
6 B  i s  
-
from where:
10  11
..  blog7T’ The  equality holds only if (H -  0) 
= SB  
x constant almost everywhere; 60
it  is easy to show that this cannot hold unless H  is an exhaustive estimator,
for,  in making a change of variables in the space !tN, with the new  variables
being H,  !1, ... , !N-1, functions of x l , ... ,  x,!, the distribution function of H
will  be G  (H,  0)  and the joint  distribution function of the !2  inside  of the
space J22 N _ 1   (H) that they span will be k (H,  6, ... , Ç, N  _ 1 ,0) 12 ;  then one has
J r  (EIO) 
=  dG[dk]13 with
further, because
10   (1)  Mr.  Frechet  has shown more generally  that  for  an  asymptotically  fair
estimator, for N  sufficiently large, it  is always true that
for an arbitrarily small e. 
11   Translator’s Note: This is a statement of the Cramer-Rao lower bound for the
variance of an unbiased estimator. It  is  historically remarkable that FRECHET,  to
whom MALECOT  attributes the result, seems to have published this in 1943 (1934
is  given incorrectly in the References). The  first appearance of the lower bound in
the statistical  literature  is  often credited to:  Rao C.R., Information and accuracy
attainable in the estimation of statistical parameters, Bull. Calcutta Math. Soc. 37
(1945) 81-91. According to C. R. Rao (personal communication) Cramer mentions
this inequality in his book, published two years later. Neyman named  it as Cramer-
Rao  inequality.
12  T r anslator’s Note: Although perhaps obvious, Mal6cot’s notation hides some-
what that this is the conditional distribution of all !’s, given H.
The  bracket  denotes a multiple differential  of the Stieltjes  type,  relative  to
variables fli  (Translator’s Note: In the original paper, Malécot has (i  instead of !2
in the footnote, which  is an obvious typographical error).one has:
also, the formula:
gives again, by taking derivatives with respect to B:
( 2   cannot be equal to 2  unless
T2
that  is  if  [dk]  and, therefore,  also  k is  independent of 0 nearly everywhere,
that is,  if H  is an exhaustive estimator; the general form of laws admitting an
exhaustive  estimator has been  given by  Mr. DARMOIS  (3) and  Mr. FRECHET
has verified (8) that the exhaustive estimator meets the condition ( 2  
= 1 !2
The condition !2 T2  14  
cannot be met for finite N  unless an exhaustive
Q
estimator exists. However, Mr. FISHER  had shown earlier  (7)  that it  would
always exist, or at least that the condition would be met asymptotically when
N --->  oo, when  an  estimator  is obtained by producing  as a function of E  a  value
of  which  maximizes the likelihood function 7r(E’!), that is,  by applying the
rule of maximum  likelihood; this estimator H o ,  being C.A.G. under  fairly wide
conditions, and  its fluctuation (,2  oc T2 1  being asymptotically smaller or equal
than that of any other such estimators, would be in the limit one of the most
precise C.A.G. estimators and  would merit the name  of optimum  estimator. Its
amount of information will be
14  T ra nslator’s  Note: This is a typographical error since the ç’s were defined as
random  variables. The  correct expression is ( 2  
= 1 or2’For any other C.A.G. estimator obtained from the same observations E  and
-- 
1  7  (!2  1 
hich is with amount of information 1 ( 2  
the ratio  £  C -2  2 = ! !z , 
which is
!  !  (!  !!!
smaller or equal to 1, will be called ef f iciency&dquo; of the estimator; it  gives the
loss of precision accruing from using an estimator other than the optimum.
We  shall now give a rigorous and general presentation of Mr. FISHER’s
theory, extending results of Mr. DOOB  and of Mr. DUGUE  (5).
Let g (x i ,  B)  be a function  of random variable x i   and of the unknown
parameter B,  and suppose that the N  random variables g (x i ,  B)  have true
means for each value of 0 that are &dquo;equally  convergent&dquo;,  that is,  that the N
probabilities 
.
have an upper bound  given by  a  function p  (t) independent of  i which generates
/.+00
a  finite integral} r+oo 0 
t dp  (t).  If we  suppose that
tends towards a limit  cp (B)  as N ---7  oo,  for every value of 0 in an interval
A...B, the extension of a result of Mr. KOLMOGOROFF  (9) 15   shows that the
quantity
deduced from N  observations a;i,...  xN, tends almost surely, when N -  oo,
towards cp (B). If one supposes that the g (x i ,  0) are almost surely functions of
B with variation bounded by the same  fixed number K  (&dquo;  equally bounded vari-
ation&dquo;,  the same holding for !  (B, N)), an extension of POLYA-CANTELLI’s
theorem shows that when N ! 00 , W  (0, N) converges almost surely towards
cp (0) in the interval A ... B 16 ,  which means  that the probability that
tends towards 1  as No ->  oo, whatever the value of  B is and for N  >  No ( q
being an arbitrary, fixed, number.
15   Translator’s Note: The  English spelling is KOLMOGOROV.
16   This holds even if there are discontinuities  (of the first  kind) by considering,
instead of  the value of  0, the limiting values at right and  left (supposed to satisfy the
same  conditions):
In what follows,  it  will be convenient to represent by  p   (B)  the set of values
comprised  between  cp (B - o) and  cp (0 +  o), and  by 0  (0, N)  the  set of  values comprised
between  cp (B - o, N) and  cp (9 +  o, N).Consider now a root 9 0   of p  (6),  suppose that it  can be found and that it
corresponds to a change of sign of  cp (B): more  precisely, suppose that in every
interval 0 1  ... B 2   surrounding 9 0   there is at least one value between 9 1   and 90
for which  cp (0) is negative, and  that there is at least one value between 0 2   and
90 for which  it  is positive. If we let  be  the smallest of the two corresponding
[p (0)  it follows from the preceding that, for N  >  No, the probability that all
the W  (B, N) change from positive to negative inside the interval 0 1  ...  B 2   and,
therefore, the  values  cancel each  other (in view  of  the  statement  in the  preceding
footnote, for the points in which there is discontinuity), tends towards 1 when
N -  oo. Because the interval 0 1  ...  B 2   in the neighborhood of 9 0   can be taken
to be arbitrarily small, this means that the equation  B ]!  (0, N) 
=  0 admits at
least a root converging almost surely to 9 o   when N -!  oo.
It  is  possible to go further if one supposes that the quantities  &mdash; . ’  0 )
<7P
and, hence, !! 
are almost surely uniformly continuous with respect to B, with
cw
equally bounded variation in A ... B, and that these have &dquo;equally convergent
a qj
true  means&dquo;.  It  follows  easily  that  !:  (B, N) converges almost surely  and
00
uniformly towards a continuous function which  is surely the derivative of  cp (0),
that is,  cp’ (0) and  then that one can associate to every  e an interval 9 0  -  a and
9 0   +  a such that the probability that
for all N  >  No and for all  between 0 0  -  a and 0 0   +  a tends towards 1 when
N, --4 00.
Now, from the formula of finite  increments, these inequalities  imply,  for
N  >  No and  for all 0 between 9 0  -  a and 90 +  a:
(where D  is the  fixed number  cp’ (0 o ));  this shows  that  the  equations XP (e, N) 
=  0
will have, for N  >  No and  within the interval 0 0  -  a and 0 0   +  a, a single root,
and  that this root will be each time between
provided  that these quantities take  values between  90 - a and 8 0 + 0 ::  this will be
attainable with  probability tending  to 1 when  No --! oc  because qf (0 0 ,  N)  tends
almost surely to ’P   (0!) 
=  0. Hence, it  is seen that the equation IF  (0o, N) 
=  0
admits only one root 8 N   tending almost surely to 0 0 ;  the probability that (for
each value of N  >  No) this root is equal towith Ei   <  e, tends towards 1 when No -+ oo irrespective of the value of 6 - 9 N
is then a correct estimator of B o l7 .
Let  us make now the  following  additional  assumptions:  the N  random
variables g (x i ,  9 0 )  constitute a normal family in the sense of Mr. P. LEVY
(for  this,  it  suffices  to suppose, using the notation of Mr.  P.  LEVY, that
1 0 00  t 2 dp  (t)  is  finite,  which implies that the fluctuations a 2   of the random
N
variables g (x i ,  9 0 )  are a bounded set and that the fluctuation 0’ 2  2  U2  of
i
N
their sum£  g (x i ,  9 0 ) 
= N I P  (90 , N) increases indefinitely with N. It is known
i
(P. LEVY, 11) that then the type of law of  this sum  tends to a Gaussian one,
and one can deduce easily (DUGUE,  5) that this law is the same  as that of
9N is,  thus, not only a correct estimator of 0 0   but C.A.G. as well.  Because
N i IJ   (0o ,  N )  has a   law   that tends towards a standard Gaussian one, this being
0’
!VD
the same  for ND  , 
the fluctuation of the estimator ON  is then:
a  (0N -  BO)
Here we  have a very general procedure for obtaining C.A.G. estimators. If,
in particular, we  take as g (x i ,  B) pertaining to the ith observation the function
which has a null mean value when 0  is  equal to the true value 0 0 ,  giving
p  (B o ) 
=  0, then the equation  q ,   (B, N) 
=  0 becomes the equation of maximum
likelihood
If the conditions of continuity and convergence given previously are met,
this equation leads to a C.A.G. estimator, 0 No ,  with a fluctuation involving:
17  Tra n slator’s  Note: Recall that correct means consistent.which shows that ! a2 
=  -Ncp’  (9!) , from where
hence,  for  a  sufficiently  large  N,  !2 <  (1 0’ ! E’), 
the  maximum likelihood
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estimator is among  the estimators having a minimum  fluctuation. Henceforth,
we  will call this an optimal estimator.
Suppose in particular that two sets with N l   and N 2   observations, respec-
tively,  have been collected, and that the observations within each set  follow
the same law, that is,  there are laws dF l   and dF 2 .  The maximum  likelihood
equation for the entire collection of observations is:
and put
This gives the solution:
If we  let 9 N i  and () N2   be the estimators obtained from each of the two sets
separately, one has
The  optimum  estimator for the entire data  set is, thus, the weighted average
of the optimum  estimators obtained from each of the individual sets, with the
weights being  A!i<7!  and N 2 o, 2 2, that is, the reciprocal of  the fluctuations !1  and
(22  (&dquo; quantities of information&dquo;)  of the two estimators. One  finds the classical
rule for combining  observations deduced by Gauss from a  principle identical to
that of maximum  likelihood.
This  result highlights again that the rule of maximum  likelihood is not valid
if applied to only a part of the observations, as the only result worth keeping
is  that pertaining to the entire  set  of observations.  The rule  of maximumlikelihood is just a particular case of  the rule of  the most  likely value ; that is
the  special case where any  information about 0 comes  through  the observations
E, while knowledge K obtained previously does not contribute at all,  so an
uniform prior probability is assigned to 0.  Furthermore, it must be observed,
with Mr. JEFFREYS, that  if one takes any continuous probability law for
0,  h  (0) dO, having continuous first  and second derivatives,  the effect  of this
law on the estimator obtained using the rule of the most likely value with N
independent observations is negligible as N -  oo. In fact, if we let E  denote
the set of such N  observations, and  let 7 r  (E [ 9) be  the corresponding likelihood
function, the posterior probability of a value 0 will be 7 r  (EIO) h  (0) dO, so the
most likely value will, thus, be the root of the equation
ä log h from where, putting ae 
=  d  ( 8 ) : dc’
and, rearranging the calculations on  page 54 19   slightly, the estimator based on
the most likely value is
If h (9 0 ) #  0,  1 (0 0 )  and l’ (0 o )  are bounded, so when N - j   oo, B N  -  6o !
9 N  -  0 0 ,  with ON being the maximum likelihood estimator; the influence of
the prior probability law becomes negligible. However, it must be emphasized
that for large but finite N  this influence is negligible only if  l (Bp)  and l’ (0 o )
are sufficiently small relative to N; on the other hand, if l’ (0 o )  is of the order
of N, that  is,  if the curve representing log h  and,  hence, that representing
h  (B)  (elementary prior probability) has a sharp peak, this is  not so;  it  is
patent, furthermore, that in this case, with the observations K made  before E,
having  already  given  precise information about  0, then  the maximum  likelihood
18   Translator’s Note: MALTCOT  refers to the mode  of the posterior distribution.
19   Translator’s Note: The  reference  is to the  page  of  the original  paper. MALÉCOT
is pointing out towards the developments leading to:
in connection with maximum  likelihood estimation.
20   Translator’s  Note:  The meaning of elementary,  an  adjective  used  often  by
French mathematicians, is unclear here. Presumably, MALECOT  means density, an
infinitesimally small element of a probability (in the continuous case).estimator ON deduced from only E, is not the best; it is necessary to combine
E  with the previous observations by applying the rule of  the probable value  21 ,
which gives the value B N .
Because the mean  value of B N   is
with El   being almost surely uniformly small with N, 
its fluctuation will be
N
This can  be  larger or smaller than !2 = 2  (fluctuation of  ON) depending  on
,  0’
whether L’ (0 o )  is  >  0 or  <  0, that is,  depending on whether the true value 0 0
lies in the neighborhood of a  &dquo;valley&dquo;  or of a  &dquo;peak&dquo;  of the curve representing
the prior probability h  (0). In the case where  (’ 2   <  !2, there is no contradiction
with the result given on page 50 22 ,  because this result establishes that !2 is
the minimum  fluctuation for all estimators H  such that M  (H) =  0 for any  0;
it can be expected that when  one does not have any  prior knowledge about the
true value 0 0   of  0 the precision of the best estimator will be !2. On  the other
hand, if one knows  that a value 0 0   is more  probable than others, the condition
M  (H) =  0 for any 0 can be a nuisance 23   and give less precision than when
would  try to estimate in a region near the most probable value.
21  T ranslator’s Note: The  author probably means  &dquo;the  most probable  value&dquo;.
22   Translator’s Note: This is the page of  the original paper where the lower bound
for the variance of an unbiased estimator is presented.
23   Translator’s Note: MALECOT  employs the term  &dquo;parasite&dquo;.  Although descrip-
tive, such a term  is not a part of the statistical lexicon in English.4. THE  PROBLEM  OF  INDUCTION
The decreasing importance of the prior probability as the number of ob-
servations increases describes certain aspects of the problem of induction in a
remarkably clear manner. This problem consists essentially of extracting from
the  results observed a  law  summarizing  them  (and which  also allows to forecast
future results); this law  is never dictated by  the observed results, rather, it is a
construction of  the mind  chosen  for reasons of  simplicity or convenience (natu-
rally taking  into account  all previous experience); one can always suppose many
laws; these play the role of the different hypotheses O i   of our scheme; each of
these, if formulated with sufficient precision, generates the observed results E
with a known  probability P  (E[0 1 K) ,  the likelihood of B i .  The  choice between
the B i   is dictated by the posterior probabilities P (0 j  [EK) , depending both on
the likelihoods, which  are objective (because these depend  only on  the observa-
tions) and  on  the prior probabilities P  (01 [ K) which  are more  or less subjective;
the evaluation of likelihoods is deductive (often in its more refined form, the
mathematical deduction); however, the subjective part always enters in the
evaluation of prior probabilities, illustrating wonderfully that every induction
is  subjective.  It  is  true that when the number of observations increases, the
subjective part decreases, as we  saw  previously. Further, the prior probabilities
can be  right away  in more  or less agreement with subsequent experience; when
KEPLER  viewed as very probable that an ellipse would fit  his observations
on Mars, he was  in immediate agreement with  all subsequent astronomical ob-
servations; on the other hand, the a priori belief that planets moved  in circles
around  the earth led PTOLEMY  and  his predecessors to formulate laws which,
by  integrating  all past observations, made  difficult, because  of  their complexity,
to predict subsequent observations. The  scheme  a  priori was  excessively subjec-
tive and  had  to be  updated  constantly  in order to account  for new  observations.
These examples show that as science progresses, that is,  as new  observations
accumulate, its subjective part diminishes, although  it would be an  illusion to
believe that  it could be  eliminated  totally. In  fact, experimental  progress always
allows us to choose, in the long run, between  several hypotheses  that have  been
formulated completely (by evaluating their likelihood deduced from  all observa-
tions made), but we  will always be incapable of formulating precisely (that is,
making  their consequences explicit)  all possible hypotheses and, consequently,
of calculating the likelihoods of all hypotheses. This is  the reason why  every
law, every possible physical theory, will always become  inadequate for explain-
ing new  facts: it has been  chosen as the most  likely of  all the laws among  those
that can be formulated, but more advanced experimentation will make  it  ap-
pear less likely than new laws that one would be led to formulate; in this form,
the system of PTOLEMY  was replaced by that of KEPLER-NEWTON,  and
then  by  relativist mechanics. Each  law  is valuable for representing both  the old
field of observations and the new  field motivating it;  however, the law cannot
pretend to represent the totality of future observations, because  it is not more
than a choice between a small number of laws that our mind conceives and,
because of the weakness of our senses and of our mind, these laws are rough
and incomplete blueprints of the rich complexity of natural phenomena. Of
course, as experiences develop, the increasing finesse of our theories molds re-
ality better but cannot pretend to grasp  it completely. &dquo;There are more  thingsin heaven and earth than in all our philosophy&dquo;.  There is more complexity in
the mechanisms of nature than we can think of and all the laws that we can
construct, even if better than the preceding ones, are just an approximation
to reality, an approximation that will become insufficient, eventually. OHM’s
law, although translating electrodynamic phenomena  remarkably to our scale,
becomes inadequate when an extension of our senses places us at the scale of
the electrons, so it becomes  just a statistical law. Is it  not possible that even
the laws of atomic physics behave eventually as statistical laws? A  scientific
law is never &dquo;true&dquo;,  that is, a definitive one, it  is only more  or less convenient
for representing and anticipating phenomena  viewed at a certain scale. When
it is said that  &dquo;a  physical theory  is justified by  its consequences&dquo;, this only has
a relative meaning, that is, that among  all theories formulated, this is the one
having consequences that agree best with the observations. In induction, there
are two very distinct parts: a deductive part that formulates the consequences
of each hypothesis considered, and a part that is not amenable to deduction
and  which  postulates hypotheses and  assigns prior probabilities to these; there
is where the genius of invention and the mind are manifested; then, the rest
consists in choosing the most probable hypothesis after the consequences. The
rule of the &dquo;most  probable hypothesis&dquo;  underlies every induction, translating
precisely the logic of induction and, at the same  time, highlighting its subjec-
tivity.  It does not seem possible to take the rule of maximum  likelihood as a
base  of  the  logic of  induction, as Mr. FISHER  does, because  this rule applied  to
different series of measurements will lead to contradictory consequences (and
must be completed  using significance tests, which  are in contradiction with  this
rule!), while a logic must be a set of principles from which one can accept all
consequences, this being  certainly the case, as we  have  argued, for a  logic based
on BAYES  formula.
5. &dquo;SUBJECTIVE&dquo; AND  &dquo;OBJECTIVE&dquo; PROBABILITIES
If,  with Mr. DE FINETTI (6), we view probability theory as a &dquo;logic  of
subjective  judgements&dquo;, how  is it possible to have an agreement between  state-
ments derived from this logic and the objective reality? This is the objection
made  frequently to the formula of BAYES. The  arbitrary form in which prior
probabilities are evaluated confers a similar arbitrariness to the evaluation of
posterior probabilities. Now, aren’t there events whose probabilities have an
objective meaning, as suggested by  an  agreement between  observed frequencies
and probabilities assigned by an a priori reasoning? We  believe that the re-
marks made  previously permit responding to this objection. Every evaluation
of probabilities is a construct of the mind, and  relative to a theoretical setting
imagined by the mind to limit our ignorance, and based on the principle of
indifference. For example, the statement that the value 6 in the toss of a die
has a probability of 6  is, at the same time, the result of ignorance about the
movement  of  the die in the dice-box, and  of the statement that there is no  rea-
son to believe that this movement favors a side over the others, hence  all sides
are equi-probable. This is relative to a certain theoretical scheme, to a certain
hypothesis: a perfect die tossed fairly. Others may make a very different eval-
uation, by admitting a personal influence of the &dquo;lucky&dquo;  player on the valuesobserved. At any rate, in the evaluation of probabilities, there will always be
hypotheses a priori that, although more  or less suggested by previous observa-
tions, will never dominate absolutely, will never be certain a priori, this being
so because  it is never possible to know  the totality of  circumstances giving rise
to a phenomenon. (In passing, we dismiss the objection that it  is not possible
to speak about  &dquo;probabilities of  causes&dquo;  because  these would  not be  &dquo;random&dquo;,
one must  be  &dquo;true&dquo;  and  the others  &dquo;false&dquo;:  if one admits  determinism, the same
is true of  the  effects; in fact, it is not the phenomena  that are random,  rather, it
is the knowledge that we  have about them; the probabilistic logic attempts to
identify the limits of our ignorance). The  role of experimentation  is to confirm
or question some  of the assumptions made  or, more generally, to update their
probabilities; if one of these appears clearly as more  probable than the others,
it would  be  retained as the best, but  it should be  kept in mind  that this superi-
ority is temporary, and  that the hypothesis could be demolished by  subsequent
experimentation. For example, consider games  of chance, such as playing dice,
to illustrate ideas. Experience has led us to abandoning the hypothesis, which
perhaps may  be natural for a primitive mind, that there is an influence of the
player on  the outcome, and  to adopting the assumption  that all sides of  the die
are equally likely,  as the best explanation for the observed results. However,
Weldon’s experiments show, in turn, that this assumption is false, as the the-
oretical scheme of the perfect die does not hold in practice; there are always
1
some  sides that are favored: the probability of  6  
is then relative to a  theoreti-
cal scheme deduced from reality by abstraction and simplification, and  it  will
never be the limit of the observed frequencies.
What makes the  theoretical  scheme  appealing  is  its  convenience:  with
everything  kept simple, it summarizes  with  sufficient precision the main  aspects
of an experiment, and it  can be expressed through formulae that are simple
and, at the same time, that allow making forecasts having a good precision.
As  it has been  stated by  Mr. DARMOIS  (2): &dquo;making a  probability calculation
in a specific case, requires seeing clearly all that it  is necessary to know, such
that the study follows closely the essential circumstances of the phenomenon
considered&dquo;.  Thus,  the  evaluation  of  a  probability  always  results  from a
theoretical scheme permitting to assess, with more  or less precision, the equal
or unequal probability; it  is completely legitimate, as stated by Mr. BOREL,
to evaluate the probability of an isolated event provided that a scheme can be
conceived where this probability is  related to other known ones (for example
in a lottery scheme) 24 .  However, the probabilities thus calculated will not be
in reasonable agreement with the observed frequencies unless the theoretical
scheme is  in sufficient agreement with the real mechanism, for example, the
equi-probable cases corresponding  with the equally frequent cases, and  this will
happen when the scheme has been established after considering a sufficiently
large number  of  experiments. It is in this situation that an  &dquo;agreement between
24  
Translator’s Note: It  is  unclear what MALTCOT  means here.  In the original
paper, he stated:  &dquo;Ainsi  L’evaluation d’une probabilite resulte toujours d’un schema
theorique permettant d’evaluer, avec plus ou moins de pr6cision,  1’6gale ou lin6gale
probabilite ;  il  est tout a fait legitime, comme  le remarque M. BOREL, d’evaluer la
probabilite d’un 6v6nement isol6 d!s qu’on peut concevoir un schema ramenant cette
probabilite a d’autres connues (par exemple, un sch6ma du tirage au  sort)&dquo;.individual opinions&dquo;  (DE FINETTI) or an &dquo;agreement  between equally well
informed minds&dquo;  will be obtained, a condition that Mr. BOREL  confers to
an &dquo;objective  probability&dquo;  (which, furthermore,  is  not a sufficient  condition
because errors of  judgment or of expertise can be committed unanimously).
On  the  other hand,  if the scheme  is established from  a  weak  knowledge  about
facts, the probabilities that can be deduced have the risk of not bearing any
relationship with  reality. This  is what  makes  Mr. DE  FINETTI  to write: &dquo;if one
does not want to take subjective factors into account explicitly, the question
should be abandoned, by stating that it is not sensible&dquo;.  This is  scarcely a
reason-the opposite, rather- for rejecting the formula  of BAYES,  since there is
a  need  for adopting  a  position (DE  FINETTI,(6), p. 26) 25 .  The  question brings
into perspective the subjectivity of this view,  as it  was done in the linkage
example. Also, the criticism of the formula made by Mr. NEYMAN  (15)  is
somewhat surprising. Mr. NEYMAN  takes as an example a set of individuals
I,  all dominant for a Mendelian factor 26 ;  it is wished to use those having the
homozygote  genotype AA,  and  to discard  the hybrid  types (Aa); to do  this, each
I is crossed with an aa, and the k descendants from this cross are observed;
if aa types are observed within these, then I is  discarded, naturally; on the
other hand, I  is kept if the k descendants are of the dominant type. However,
in so doing, some  of the individuals I kept will be of the undesirable type Aa;
the problem is  the evaluation of the risk of such an error.  Because an I of
the AA  type produces only dominant descendants, and an I of the type Aa
Bk
gives  k descendants that are  all dominant  with  probability C 2 I 
the  posterior
probability of  keeping an  I  which  will be Aa, using BAYES  formula, and  letting
p o   be the prior probability that I is Aa  will be:
It is clear that if p o   is &dquo;objective&dquo;, that is,  if it reflects an  observable frequency,
then p i   provides a forecast of the frequency of errors.  If,  for example, it is
known that the I individuals come from crossing heterozygotes, one would
take po 
=  3, representing the frequency of heterozygotes in a large number  of
individuals I examined. Then:
would sensibly represent the proportion of individuals that,  although kept,
possess the Aa  type, that is, the proportion of  errors. However, if the origin of
I and, hence p o ,  is unknown, the equation evidently looses part of its specific
meaning. Should  one, then, with Mr. NEYMAN,  declare  it useless? 27 .  It is clear
25   Translator’s Note:  I  have translated  &dquo;adopter  une ligne  de  conduite&dquo;  as  &dquo;for
adopting a  position&dquo;.
Translator’s Note:  Although perhaps obvious from the context, MALECOT
means that the set I includes individuals with at least a copy of the allele A.
27   Translator’s Note: The  author refers to BAYES  formula here.at the onset that no other formula, in the absence of additional experiments,
can give us the proportion of errors, because from the equation, this is linked
to p o ,  and  this is unknown. Any  estimation of  error needs a  judgement, explicit
or not, about the value of p o ,  and in the formula of BAYES  this judgement
must be made explicit. The formula shows, for example, that if k =  6,  the
statement that there is  at least  1  error in 65 is equivalent to stating that p o
is  ! -, 2 
which may or may not be viewed as reasonable depending on the
information available about how  the individuals I were obtained. None  of the
two statements has a stronger foundation than the other, and any reasoning
attempting to give more credibility to the preceding one would be erroneous.
BAYES formula,  establishing an exact correspondence between the  &dquo;prior&dquo;
and  the &dquo;posterior&dquo;  probabilities shows clearly that a judgement based on  the
latter ones is  equivalent to a judgement on the former ones, and that this is
unavoidable, except in some  special cases to be  discussed in Section 7. Further,
this formula  has  value  for the interpretation of  subsequent experiments: if these
involve a genetic analysis of the individuals I kept, from which  it follows that
the frequency of errors can be evaluated, this leads to an  &dquo;objective&dquo;  value of
p l ,  that is, of  the composition of  the initial population, information which may
be precious for other experiments.
6. NEYMAN’S  POINT OF VIEW
After having shown that  the statistical  ideas  advanced by Mr.  Fisher’s
school of thought cannot be justified logically without introducing the &dquo;rule
of the most probable value&dquo;  deduced from BAYES  formula, we will consider
now  the methods with which Mr. NEYMAN  has thought it  is possible to by-
pass  this  formula while providing  &dquo;objective&dquo;  criteria,  expressible in terms
of frequencies.  The problem, as posed by Mr. NEYMAN, is  to decide  if  a
hypothesis H o   is to be  &dquo;rejected&dquo;  or  &dquo;accepted&dquo;  according  to whether  the point
E  having as coordinates the N  observed values :ri,...,:E!,  is  found inside of
a certain &dquo;critical  region&dquo;  w  or inside of a complementary region ill of the N-
dimensional  space J22 N   (&dquo;observations space&dquo; ) (classical examples: significance of
the  difference between  a  theoretical mean  and  an  observed mean, by  comparing
their difference with  their standard  error; assessment of  goodness  of  fit with  the
x 2  method). This decision can  produce an  error in two  different manners: if H o
is rejected when  it holds true, one makes a type-1  error (the only one that is
classically taken  into account in the two  preceding examples). If one accepts H o
when  it is false, a type-2 error results. The  idea of Mr. NEYMAN  is evaluating
the probabilities of these two errors separately and &dquo;objectively&dquo;,  that is,  to
predict their frequencies (by deduction and not by induction, as emphasized
by Mr. NEYMAN).
Consider the case where the hypothesis to be examined concerns the value
of a parameter  B intervening in the probability law f  (x, 0)  taken for  each
observation  x.  Because the  function  f is  supposed to be known, one can
calculate,  as a function of 0,  the probability that the point 3 ;i,...,. T j B r  falls
in  the critical  region w.  This probability,  P (E c w[0) =  0 (0, w)  is  called
&dquo;power  function&dquo;  of the criterion based on w.  If the hypothesis H o   to be
examined attributes a value 0 0   to the parameter, the probability of a type-1error calculated under  hypothesis H o   will be 0 (B o ,  w), and  that of  a  type-2  error,
calculated supposing that the true value is 0 1   will be (3 (()l, w) 
=  1 - (3 (()l, w).
Mr. NEYMAN  proposes  first to reduce  the probability of  errors of  the  first type
to a fixed, sufficiently small value, a, defining a family of &dquo;equivalent  critical
regions&dquo; w  in terms  of  the formula  /3 (0 0 ,  w) 
=  a: then, attempt  to choose one  of
these regions such  that the type-2 error is as small as possible, and  this for any
0 1   in a certain domain; hence, this defines a criterion that is &dquo;uniformly most
powerful&dquo;  in this domain (but this criterion exists only for very specific laws f
and, provided that the domain  is restricted sufficiently. This is the reason why
the domain  is often restricted to the neighborhood of 0 0 ).
Our  first criticism is  as follows: why would one want first to minimize the
type-1 error? Mr. NEYMAN  points out to a case where the consequences of a
type-1 error would be much  more  important than those of a type-2 error: for a
pharmacological product  which, by  accident, can  contain  a  toxic substance, and
which  has  been  assayed  previously on  some  animals,  it is essential not  to discard
the hypothesis H o :  &dquo;the product  is dangerous&dquo;, because  it is accurate; however,
the consequences are not serious if this hypothesis  is kept, even  if it is false; the
problem  is,  then, essentially, one of reducing the type-1 error. However, this is
a very particular situation. In general, the cases where one will be concerned
about the type-1  error are those where a priori there are strong reasons to
believe that H o   is  accurate: in fact, reducing the type-1 error leads, most of
the times, to an increase of the type-2 error in the neighborhood. If one can
vary  B in a continuous manner  and  if (3 (B, w) is a continuous function of  0, the
two errors become evident in the curve representing the function, because the
corresponding probabilities are, respectively, the ordinate at abscissa 0 0   (where
0 0   is the value under scrutiny) and the complement to 1 of the ordinate with
abscissa 0 1   (B l  
=  true value); even  if the region w  is chosen such that one has a
uniformly most powerful criterion, in those rare cases where  it exists, it  is still
true that a reduction of a  will cause in general a reduction of the neighboring
coordinates, that is, an  increase of  the type-2 error, provided the true value 9 1
is not too far from the value 0 0   under scrutiny. For example, in the estimation
1
of linkage,  it  is  frequent to reject the hypothesis r = 2 
if the estimate of r
obtained from the experiments it  is  away from -  2 by 
more than A times its
standard error. The  larger A is, the smaller the risk of  rejecting the hypothesis
r = 2  if  this holds; however, there  will be  some  risk of  discarding  the  hypothesis
that r has a value other than -  2 but near -  2 when 
this hypothesis is true. In
general, the  weight  to be  assigned  to the two  types of  error, that  is, the  choice of
a, depends inevitably on assumptions made  a priori about the probabilities of
H o   and  of  the other hypotheses. The  method  of Mr. NEYMAN  cannot pretend
to give an &dquo;objective&dquo;  judgement about H o ;  its appeal resides in making the
distinction between the two distinct classes of  error, but it  is incapable, in the
absence of any consideration a priori, of assigning appropriate weights to the
two; now, the more  clear manner  of incorporating a priori considerations is to
introduce prior probabilities; if these are subjective, so be  it.
Let us go further:  this method not only does not permit to evaluate the
global frequency of errors in the absence of knowledge of prior probabilities,as acknowledged by Mr. NEYMAN, but it  does not allow evaluation of the
frequency of errors of each type and, contrary to what seems to be stated by
Mr. NEYMAN,  it does not furnish any observable frequency. In fact, 0  (0 o ,  w)
just measures the frequency of errors of the first type that would take place if
H o   were always true; 1-  0  (0 1 ,  w) measures  the frequency that the errors of  the
second type would have provided the hypothesis  0 = 0 1   were always true; now,
in practice, we do not have any certainty about these hypotheses, this being
precisely the reason why  we wish to arrive at a probabilistic judgement about
these; hence, we  are incapable of predicting to what extent the real frequencies
of these errors correspond to the preceding probabilities unless, naturally, one
knows for the different values of 0 the &dquo;objective&dquo;  prior probabilities, that is,
expressible in terms of frequencies.
Let K  be the prior  probability that  the hypothesis  0 = 0 0   holds and
(1 - K)  dg (0 1 )  (STIELTJES’ differential)  be the prior probability that 0 =
0 1  #  Oo (f L   dg (0 1 ) 
=  1, with L  denoting  the domain  of  variation of 0 1 ,  excluding
0 0 );  the posterior probabilities, when  it  is known that the observations have
given a result falling in w, are respectively proportional to:
giving as posterior probabilities of the errors of the first and second types:
(probability that H o   is  true given that the observations fall in w, leading to
rejection of Ho).
(probability that H o   is  false given that the observations fall in to  ill,  leading to
acceptance of Ho).
28   Translator’s  Note:  Without  warning,  MALTCOT changes  the  notation
/3 (B, w) to 13 (9 [ w)  hereinafter.The  posterior probability of any error is:
It  is  seen that the prior probabilities (K and  g (0))  intervene in an essential
manner  in the expected frequencies of the two errors and in the weights to be
assigned to these. The coefficients by which ¡3 (8 l lw ) 29   and 0   (8llw) must be
weighted are the prior probabilities K  and (1 - K)  dg (8 d ;  the choice of the
size of a, for which Mr. NEYMAN  does not offer any guidance, is  implicitly
equivalent to an assumption  about the  prior probability K  of 0 0 ;  by  considering
only the type-1 error and minimizing a (as in the usual case of evaluating the
significance of  deviations, or in the x2  test) this is equivalent to supposing  that
K  is close to 1  so that (1 - K) f  ¡ 3  (0 1   IT) dg (0 1 )  in P  is negligible relative to
Ka  (although the value of the integral, ranging between 1 - a and 0 in the
usual case where a  (8Iw) is minimum  for 0 0 ,  can be of the order of 1 - a for
certain laws of the prior probability dg (0 1 )
7. THE  &dquo;CONFIDENCE INTERVALS&dquo;
The  problem has been addressed in a  different form by several authors, and
by Mr. NEYMAN  in another report (13). We  shall modify the presentation of
his theory by  introducing  prior probabilities. Let dg  (0) be  the prior probability
of an unknown parameter intervening in the probability law of the random
variable under  study  (this parameter  can  vary  within an  interval  a ... b which  we
shall denote  as L), and  let E i   (i 
=  1, 2, ... , n) be  the  different possible outcomes
(these being  mutually  exclusive) of  the  set of  possible experiments  involving  this
random  variable. For  each  possible E i   we  introduce a  corresponding  &dquo;estimating
set&dquo;  (supposed to be measurable) O i   contained in L, and we shall agree that
if E i   is  observed, the true value of  B will be regarded as belonging to the
corresponding Oi.  If O i   is  an interval, we shall refer to  it  as a &dquo;confidence
interval&dquo;  associated to E i .
(The situation in  Section 6 was one where the E i   were distributed only
into two  categories, w and  w, and where  the corresponding estimating sets are
0 # 0 0   and  0 = 0 0 ,  thus non-overlapping; what it  is different now  is that the
estimating sets 8 i   corresponding to the different values of  i can overlap).
Let again  7 r (E i I8)  denote  the  probability  of  observing E i   when  the parameter
has value B; the total probability of observing E i   is
BAYES  formula gives as posterior probability that  9 is not in 8 i   (i.e., that it
belongs to the complementary set L - O i ),  given that E i   has been observed:
29 Translator’s Note: MALECOT  probably means  ,(3 (Bp!zv).consequently, the total prior probability that the rule &dquo; B is in 8 i   when E i   has
been  observed&dquo;  leads to a false statement is:
The interesting aspect of this formula is  that, by choosing the 8 i   conve-
niently, is  it  possible to arrange it  such that  7   is always smaller than a fixed
limit,  irrespective of the prior probability law g(0)  of the parameter; suppose
that when  0 varies in the interior of L - 8 i ,  7 r  (E i   [0) # 6, with 8 being a limit
independent  of  i, which can be reduced arbitrarily by reducing the L - 8 i ;  the
formula of the mean  then gives that
and the sum inside the brackets cannot increase when the sets L - 8 i   are
reduced and, hence, in particular, when  6 is reduced; hence, this can be made
arbitrarily small, which  proves the statement. Therefore, one  can always choose
the O i   such that, without knowing anything about g (B),  it  is assured that the
probability that the rule adopted leads to an error that  is  smaller than a
fixed number e,  hence, on average, one will make mistakes in  a proportion
of experiments that is smaller than E . Thus, one can speak of an &dquo;objective&dquo;
probability of error and &dquo;independent  of the prior probabilities&dquo;;  however, it
should be pointed out that limiting &dquo;objectively&dquo;  the probability of error has
a penalty in terms of reduced precision of a statement concerning 0;  first, by
use of the rule stated, we arrive only at the statement &dquo;B  is  in a given set&dquo;
and not:  &dquo;0  has a specific value&dquo;;  then,  if the objective of the experiment is
to judge a specific value of 0 deduced from a theory, or to obtain a numerical
value permitting subsequent evaluations, this value can be examined only in
the light of  certain prior probabilities, as we  established in Section VI. Besides,
even  if one  is satisfied with  giving an  indeterminate answer  within a  certain  set,
it must  be  noted  that the  sets 8 i   corresponding  to the  different results E i   could
have considerable overlap, and  in some  cases there could be a part common  to
all 8 i ;  hence, the method  will often be unable to choose, after the experiment,
one set from a collection of overlapping sets, but will just allow to keep after
the experiment a certain number  of  sets from this group without being able to
choose among these (perhaps even some of these sets will never be rejected,
irrespective of  the results!). Nevertheless, these remarks should not make  loose
sight of the attribute of  the method, which  is to provide an upper limit for the
probability of error that is  completely independent of the prior probabilities, a
limit which will be usable only in the case where we do not know absolutely
anything about the latter.
The  result is extended  easily, by  modifying the notation slightly, to the case
where  all the possible results form a measurable continuum 9  in a space J22.  If
one lets 7 r  (E[0) dE  be the probability that when  the parameter has value 0 a
result belonging to an element with volume dE  is observed around a point E,
and 6  (E) be the estimating set (supposed to be measurable) associated withE, and if one adopts the rule &dquo;state  that when one observes E, then  B is in
19 (E)&dquo;,  the prior probability that this statement will be false is:
To  be more  specific, let us adopt the presentation of  Mr. NEYMAN,  and  put
in brackets a  generalization of  his statements. Let E  be the experimental point
(set of N  observations x l ,  X2 , - -  xnr) describing a continuum 3 in a space
!J2N; to each value 6 0   of  the parameter we  associate an  &dquo;acceptance set&dquo;  A  (B o )
&dquo;of  size equal [or larger than] to a&dquo;,  which by definition is  a measurable set
(function of 0 0 )  of  points in !J2N chosen such  that the probability that E  belongs
to this set, calculated under the hypothesis  0 = 0 0 ,  is equal [or larger than] to
a. Further, associate to each experimental point E  the set 8  (E) of values of
0 0   for which A  (0 0 )  contains E; this set 8  (E) will be called &dquo;estimating  set
of 0, with a confidence coefficient equal [or larger than] to c!&dquo; .  If,  for each E
observed, we agree to state that the true value of B is  in the interior of the
corresponding 8 (E), it  is  easy to show that the total prior probability that
this rule leads to an error is independent of the prior probability of 0 and is
equal [or smaller than] to 1-a.  In fact, this probability -y is given by  the above
formula, that is, by a multiple integral over the domain:
(because there is a  logical equivalence between  the two  propositions: &dquo;E  is not
a part of A  (0)&dquo;  and  &dquo;0 0   is not a part of O  (E)&dquo; )  enabling us to write also:
However the integral to the right is,  for any 0, by definition of A  (0), smaller
or equal to 1 - a, the same holding for -y,  thus completing the proof.
This proof puts in evidence, better than that of Mr. NEYMAN,  the class
of trials on which the probabilities are defined: is the set of all possible trials
from all possible values of  8 distributed according to an unknown law dg  (0).
Mr. NEYMAN  uses well the logical equivalence between the 2 propositions
noted above, but he does not emphasize that this does not imply the equality
of their probabilities unless these are defined over the same  class of trials. For
example, this would not give the probability of error in the set of cases where
we observe a given E i   event (selection of results), because, from the formula
on p.  68!° giving Q i ,  it would be necessary to know the prior probability of
this event. If there is any conceptual confusion concerning the probability 1- a
attached to a confidence interval, it is because there is an  incomplete definition
of the corresponding category of trials.  It seems to us that one must see there
a posterior probability of error calculated over the set  of all  possible trials,
30  T ranslator ’s  Note: Page 68 of the original paper.and independently of the prior probability of 0, thus &dquo;objective&dquo;.  What Mr.
FISHER  cautiously calls &dquo;fiducial  probability&dquo;  is a  true probability, as rightly
observed by Mr. NEYMAN.
There is  a well known application of this  theory,  this  being the rule  of
&dquo;STUDENT&dquo;. If the x i   are N  observed, independent, values with mean x  of  the
same random variable following the law of LAPLACE-GAUSS  with unknown
expectation 0, we  can take as estimating set with a  confidence coefficient a  the
&dquo;confidence interval&dquo;
with  t linked to a  through the formula:
The statement that  0 belongs to such interval would give a frequency of
errors equal to 1 - a, over a long series of experiments of the same type, and
where there is no  selection of results.
The  theory of  confidence intervals can be combined with that of  estimation.
Often, for a  parameter  0 with  unknown  true  value 0 0 ,  one  possesses an  estimator
E deduced from  a  large  number N  of observations,  that  it  is  correct 3l ,
asymptotically Gaussian, and  with a known  standard  error, which  is a function
of 0 0 ,  that  is,  0’ (() o ).  The interval B o  -  A u  (0 o ) 
... 0 0   +  Aa  (0 o )  is  for E an
acceptance  set of  size a  connected to the  &dquo;critical coefficient&dquo;  A by  the formula
if,  within the interval where 0 0   can vary, a (0 0 )  admits an upper limit or,  it  is
seen  that the  interval  E’&mdash;A<7...  !+A<7,  entirely determined  by  the  observations,
will be a confidence interval for 0, with a confidence coefficient larger or equal
than a.
In  particular,  if  E is  the maximum likelihood  estimator,  hence one of
those minimizing a (e o ),  and if the margin of uncertainty about 0 0   is  small
enough such that 0’  (E)  is  not too different  from 0’  (eo),  the  interval  E &mdash;
Aa  (E) ... E +  Aa  (E)  will give a confidence interval of size a for 0,  and it
will be, among  all confidence intervals of size a derived from different C.A.G.
estimators, the smallest one. This  is why  the rule indicated has practical value,
by giving a maximum  reduction of the uncertainty about 0 while maintaining
an  &dquo;objective&dquo;  probability of error (besides, as suggested already in Section 2,
this rule has the effect of grouping the value with maximum  likelihood, very
31  T ransl ator’s  Note: This means consistent, as seen earlier.unlikely by  itself, with the neighboring values; however, we have now  replaced
the consideration of  posterior probabilities of  different values, which depend  on
the prior probabilities, by that of  the total probability of error, which  does not
depend on these).
Nevertheless,  it  must be pointed out that possessing certain information
about the prior probability of  B is necessary and  sufficient to reduce even more
the interval without increasing the probability of error 1 - a. In particular,
one could not logically take a specific value of the interval without making
assumptions, explicitly or not, about the prior probabilities. If,  for example, an
interval containing an  integer value of  B has been  obtained, adopting this value
of  B rather than  the estimate E  will often depend  on  theoretical considerations
a priori (for example, if  8 is the linkage coefficient  r defined already on page
47 32 ,  or if it  is an atomic weight).
To finish,  let us give an example of a confidence interval based on a small
number  of  observations. Suppose, with Mr. FRECHET,  that from an urn with
a completely unknown  composition, a single ball (suppose  it is white) is drawn.
What  can we  say then  about  the probability of  drawing  balls of  the same  color?
If p  is the (unknown) value of  this probability and f =  0 or 1  is the frequency
of white balls that can be observed in a single draw, an acceptance set of size
>_  0 :  would be defined by:
The  confidence intervals for p  with coefficient >_  a can be deduced to be:
which  implies, to clarify the ideas, that if one repeats the experiment in a  large
number of urns having an arbitrary composition, and that if one states each
time that the prior probability of the observed result,  no matter what this  is,
1
would be !! I , 
one would be wrong in  at most  1 of every 100 such trials.
! 100
On  the other hand, it  is impossible to bound the probability that, in the case
that one observes a white ball (selection of results), one makes a mistake by
1
stating that the probability of whites is ! 100 (it is evident that all urns could
100
contain less than  100  
of whites). The criterion does not allow us to choose
100
one among several hypotheses,  these  being stated before  the  experiment and
mutually exclusive, for example, between  the hypotheses  p > &OElig;, &OElig; ! P !  1 - a,
p  <  1-a;  it only  enables  us, after each  experiment, to reject a single one  among
these 3; it does not permit us, ever, to reject the second one because  this is the
common  part of the 2 confidence intervals. This illustrates the remarks made
on page 69 33 .
32   Translator’s Note: The page number  of the original paper.
33   Translator’s Note: The  page number  of the original manuscript.In summary, we  see that the theory of  confidence intervals allows us to make
&dquo;objective&dquo; judgements  free from  a  frequency  of  error that  is known  or bounded,
but only in the following form: after the experiment, discard certain intervals
where the bounds depend on the results of the experiment; however, this does
not permit us to choose a  given value, or often to choose between  one  or several
values fixed a priori, so it becomes indispensable (unless one refuses to make
this choice) to invoke a scheme of prior probabilities formulated in a more or
less clear manner. This  is necessary if one wishes to take into account previous
experiments, unless their benefits are dispensed with willingly, as pointed out
by STUDENT  in the title of one of  his tables (JEFFREYS, (10), p. 310).
8. INDETERMINACY  OF  A  SET OF  HYPOTHESES
In the preceding development, it  was supposed that the probability law is
known  perfectly once 0 is fixed and, hence, that all the consequences of  all such
possible hypotheses can be stated.  In practice, as we observed in Section 4,
this is  not so: the hypotheses that one can state, and their consequences do
not cover in an exhaustive manner the field of all possible hypotheses, so the
sum of their probabilities, a priori or a posteriori,  give a number  <  1;  the
rules that we have given lead one to making a choice between the hypotheses
stated, but do not prejudge at all about the probabilities of those that have
not been formulated  yet, and  these may  be appreciable, because the history of
scientific theories  is the  history of  the abandonment  of  old hypotheses and  of  the
keeping of  the newly  formulated ones. For example, when  a law f  (x, B) derived
from theoretical considerations is  fitted to data,  it  would be better to avoid
suggesting, in agreement with Mr. MATHER,  that all that can be extracted
from the observations can be summarized in a confidence interval about B,
and it should be always kept in mind that f  (x, B) may  be inexact! Certainly,
in  general,  we will be incapable of formulating precisely  all  alternatives to
the validity of f (!, B),  but it  would be prudent to reserve a non-null prior
probability for these alternatives, which will avoid a situation where f  (x, 0)
receives a brutal refutation in the case that,  subsequently, the alternatives
become  more  plausible and  their posterior probabilities increase, at the  expense
of that of  the former! As  it has been said by CLAUDE  BERNARD,  we  should
not forget that the scientist must sacrifice as many theories as needed, &dquo;like
the general that has had many  horses killed but that still advances&dquo; .
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